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 America is becoming more like Europe, and not in a good way.  For a long 
time, the central difference between antitrust enforcement in the United States and 
Europe has been that the United States features not only public enforcement, but a 
vigorous system of private antitrust enforcement, while in Europe, public agencies 
have had an effective monopoly on antitrust enforcement.  But that difference is on 
the verge of collapsing.  We are achieving a form of convergence.  But contrary to 
expectations, this convergence is not coming from reforms to make private 
enforcement more effective in Europe, which have not yet overcome some serious 
obstacles on discovery and class actions.  Instead, it is coming from the recent US 
Supreme Court decision in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant,1 which 
threatens to gut private antitrust enforcement in the United States by replacing it 
with ineffective forms of arbitration. 
                                           
1 570 U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2559386 
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 Procedural differences explain the prior divergence between the United 
States and Europe on private antitrust enforcement.  After all, private claims for 
violations of European competition law can and have been brought, so it is not as if 
European law bans private antitrust suits.  However, limited discovery and the lack 
of class-action suits have generally meant that private suits are usually infeasible in 
Europe.  Nowadays, you generally cannot prove antitrust damages without proving 
market definition, market power, and the economic effects of the conduct.  Proving 
those elements requires market data and economic experts to analyze it.  But 
without discovery, a private plaintiff cannot obtain the necessary data, and without 
class action mechanisms, a disperse group of market participants cannot fund the 
expensive expert reports necessary to analyze it.  Thus, in Europe, the field of 
antitrust enforcement has largely been left to public enforcers.  The new EU 
directive on antitrust damages encourages European nations to provide more 
private discovery and to allow at least opt-in class actions, but does not yet 
mandate clear rules to solve these problems.   
 Historically matters have been quite different in the United States, which 
also effectively requires market data and economic experts to prove antitrust 
damages, but instead allows liberal discovery to collect that market data and class 
actions to fund the economic experts.  Or at least that was the law before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Italian Colors.  In that case, the Supreme Court 
3 
 
considered “whether a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under 
the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff's cost of individually arbitrating a 
federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.”2  The decision recognized 
that “the cost of an expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would be 
‘at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,’ while the 
maximum recovery for an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when 
trebled.”3  As Justice Kagan observed in dissent, “No rational actor would bring a 
claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant incurring costs in the 
hundreds of thousands.”4  Accordingly, Justice Kagan and the Second Circuit 
concluded, the contract provision waiving class arbitration fell afoul of the rule that 
arbitration provisions should not be enforced when they prevent the “effective 
vindication” of federal law.5 
 How, then, did the Supreme Court majority justify its conclusion that the 
effective vindication of antitrust law was not thwarted by a provision that required 
plaintiffs to proceed in an individual way that meant costs would be at least 10 
times the possible recovery if the plaintiff won?  Its analysis boiled down to one 
thin paragraph, with two thinner reasons. 
                                           
2 133 S.Ct. at 2307. 
3 Id. at 2308. 
4 Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J, dissenting). 
5 Id. at 2313-2320 (Kagan, J, dissenting); In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, 
554 F.3d 300, 315–316 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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 First, in an effort to distinguish prior cases holding that arbitration clauses 
could neither waive a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies nor impose 
arbitration fees that were too large to make access practicable, the Supreme Court 
argued that those cases involved the ability or expense necessary to “pursue” the 
statutory remedy, rather than “the expense involved in proving a statutory 
remedy”.6  As the dissent pointed out, this amounted to simply saying that the prior 
cases involved different facts; the whole point of having a principle like “effective 
vindication” is that enforceability can be gutted in a myriad of ways, so we need a 
general principle to deal with all the variations.7  More fundamentally, there simply 
is no meaningful difference between the right to pursue a claim and the right to 
prove it, given that pursuing a claim necessarily requires proving it to win.  It is 
rather like saying you have the right to be represented at trial by counsel, as long as 
your counsel does not speak. 
 Second, the Supreme Court reasoned that the 1890 and 1914 Congresses that 
enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts could not possibly have thought that class 
action procedure was necessary to effectively indicate federal antitrust rights 
because those Acts were enacted decades before federal class actions were made 
possible by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.8  But the Court failed to grapple 
                                           
6 Id. at 2310-11 (emphasis in original). 
7 Id. at 2317-18 (Kagan, J, dissenting). 
8 Id,. at 2311. 
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with the simple fact that back then plaintiffs could and usually did prove antitrust 
violations and damages without any economic rigor and thus did not need an 
economics expert.  That made individual low-stakes antitrust suits far more 
possible.  Now that the courts have interpreted federal antitrust law to require an 
economically rigorous showing on market definition, power, and effects, antitrust 
claims require an economics expert, precluding individual low-stakes suits and 
thus requiring some sort of class procedure to share the costs. 
The Court conceded that “‘the effective-vindication rule asks about the 
world today, not the world as it might have looked when Congress passed a given 
statute’”, but the Court reasoned that “time does not change the meaning of 
effectiveness, making ineffective vindication today what was effective vindication 
in the past.”9  However, this reasoning is simply not responsive because the point is 
that changes in the world require economic expert testimony to prove a claim now 
but not then.  This change demonstrates that under a constant meaning of 
effectiveness, a procedure that does not allow expert testimony makes vindication 
ineffective now, even though it would not have made it ineffective back then when 
no expert testimony was required to prove a claim.  To put it another way, the 
Congress that enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts intended to create a right of 
private antitrust enforcement.  That Congress might have thought that right would 
                                           
9 Id. at 2311 n.4.   
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be vindicated without class actions back when little proof was required, and that 
Congress might have thought that right could be vindicated when the courts 
required additional expensive proof as long as class procedures allowed that proof 
to be funded.  But that Congress could not have thought that right would be 
vindicated if the courts both required additional expensive proof and disallowed 
any class procedures necessary to fund it. 
 Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion actually offered a more coherent 
rationale: that plaintiff’s voluntary consent to the arbitration provision required 
enforcing that provision even it waived effective or even literal enforcement of a 
statutory right.10  This consent rationale raises an important challenge that I think 
helps explain the sort of instinct that led the Court to be so unconcerned with 
whether or not it was really preserving effective vindication.  After all, if 
customers voluntarily consent to an arbitration provision that guts an enforcement 
right, cannot we conclude that those customers must have thought that the 
enforcement right was worth less than whatever they got in return in the contract 
negotiation? Would not preventing enforcement of such provisions thus make 
customers worse off? 
 To address this challenge, it is best to begin by asking ourselves a 
foundational question: why do we have antitrust laws at all?  After all, virtually all 
                                           
10 Id. at 2312-13 (Thomas, J, concurring). 
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antitrust violations require the consent of the defendant’s customers.  If defendants 
enter into a cartel or merger that raises prices, buyers could in theory defeat it by 
refusing to pay any increase in prices.  The cartel or merger works only because 
buyers instead consent to those prices.  If a monopolist uses predatory pricing, 
tying, exclusive dealing, or other exclusionary conduct to exclude its rivals and 
raise prices to consumers, those consumers could in theory defeat the conduct by 
refusing to accept the predatorily-priced good, the tying condition, or any other 
exclusive or exclusionary condition.  Exclusionary conduct works only if buyers 
consent to it.  Thus, the consent logic wrongly implies that all antitrust violations 
must benefit the buyers who agree to them, precisely contrary to purpose of 
antitrust law, which is to protect consumer welfare. 
 The flaw in this consent logic is that buyers in markets have a collective 
action problem.  If buyers acted together, then they would refuse to consent to 
conduct that harms them all.  But acting individually, each buyer has incentives to 
agree to inflated prices or exclusionary conditions because they know that in a 
market with many buyers, no individual buyer’s refusal to consent will affect the 
market result, but an individual refusal to consent will affect whether that buyer 
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gets the good it desires.11  The whole reason we have antitrust laws is to provide a 
collective action solution, via statute, to our collective action problem. 
 The same problem infects consents to arbitration clauses that waive the right 
to effective vindication of antitrust law.  If buyers acted together, then they would 
only consent if those waivers made them better off.  But acting individually, each 
buyer has incentives to consent in exchange for a trivial discount from the inflated 
marketwide prices that will result when all buyers consent to effectively 
immunizing antitrust violations against them.  It takes only a trivial discount 
because each buyer know that its individual decision whether to consent has little 
effect on whether the marketwide harm from immunizing antitrust violations 
occurs.   
 To put it another way, competitive markets are a public good, from which 
each buyer in a market benefits, whether or not that buyer contributes to the 
creation of that public good by rejecting conduct or agreements that keep that 
market competitive.  Thus, buyers inevitably have incentives not to contribute; 
instead they will predictably consent to conduct and arbitration waivers that result 
in uncompetitive markets. 
                                           
11 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397, 456-457 (2009) (detailing this issue for the sort 
of tying claim considered in the Italian Colors case); Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization 
Standards, 56 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 253, 284–28 (2003) (detailing it for other 
exclusionary conduct).  
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 The future implications are alarming.  Given the Italian Colors decision, it is 
hard to see why all businesses would not at least insert arbitration clauses into their 
contracts that preclude class arbitration.  Indeed, 90% of financial agreements 
already have arbitration clauses that preclude consumer class actions.12  Given the 
limited nature of discovery in arbitration, that alone will bring US private 
enforcement largely into convergence with Europe, and perhaps will leave US 
private enforcement even less effective than the EU in the future if the new EU 
directive leads to stronger national rules on discovery and class actions.  
 But businesses are likely to go even further given the Supreme Court’s logic 
that arbitration provisions are permissible whenever they eliminate only the right to 
prove a claim, rather than the right to pursue it.  Under this logic, parties could 
adopt arbitration provisions eliminating the ability to introduce economic expert 
testimony altogether, even though that would effectively preclude not only class 
suits but also suits by corporate plaintiffs that might have large enough stakes to 
fund an expert.  The Court’s offered two responses to this possibility.  First, it said 
“it is not a given that such a clause would constitute an impermissible waiver,”13 
which alarmingly suggests it might well be deemed enforceable.  Second, it said 
that this possibility would be different because “such a clause, assuming it makes 
                                           
12 See http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2014/04/09/cfpb-and-ftc-representatives-speak-at-
symposium-on-fine-print/  
13 Id. at 2311 n.3. 
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vindication of the claim impossible, makes it impossible not just as a class action 
but even as an individual claim.”14 But that rationale conflicts with the Court’s 
logic that the difference is between being able to pursue a claim and prove it.  It 
thus, disturbingly, suggests that the Court’s real rationale is a hostility to class 
actions over corporate suits, rather than a neutral reading of the arbitration statute. 
 Moreover, the Court’s logic would also seem to permit many other possible 
ways of gutting antitrust enforcement that the Court did not address.  Parties could 
adopt provisions that preclude discovery even more than it is already limited in 
arbitration, say by barring any discovery into market definition, power, or 
anticompetitive effects.  Indeed, the Court’s distinction between barring proof 
versus barring pursuit of a claim would even suggest that arbitration clauses could 
baldly prohibit offering any proof in arbitration on market definition, power, or 
anticompetitive effects, because that would go simply to the right to prove the 
claim.  This would leave private enforcement by US buyers even less effective 
than in Europe. 
 This development would immunize businesses against US federal antitrust 
enforcement by anyone who contracts with them, which is almost any private party 
who can sue given that federal antitrust law largely limits antitrust enforcement to 
direct purchasers.  The main exception would be antitrust suits by rivals excluded 
                                           
14 Id. 
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by exclusionary conduct, who may have no contract with the defendant and thus no 
arbitration provision.  But that is hardly an adequate substitute because “any rival 
claim will be limited to the competitive profits the rival could have earned on some 
share of the market in the but-for world. A monopolist will generally find it 
profitable to pay such low competitive profits on a smaller market share out of the 
monopoly profits it gains on its monopoly market share.”15  Further, “it is too easy 
to cut side deals with rivals through settlements that may satisfy the financial 
interests of the rivals but fail to fix (or even worsen) the anticompetitive 
problem.”16  Indeed, the Italian Colors decision creates incentives for them to cut 
side deals that include arbitration provisions that bar effective antitrust 
enforcement between them.  And given that the Italian Colors allows each 
business to use arbitration clauses that effectively immunize them against their 
buyers, businesses might not have much incentive to even try to exclude each other 
since it is more profitable to instead collude and jointly exploit their buyers. 
 Michael Blechman’s thoughtful paper in this conference offers various ways 
an arbitrator might resist the unjust effects of Italian Colors.  His paper convinces 
me that he would be a terrific and creative arbitrator.  But I don’t think this 
resistance would be effective. 
                                           
15 Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 79, 85 
(2009). 
16 Id. 
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First, just as a factual clarification, my thesis does not depend upon any 
assumption that expert opinions would necessarily cost a million dollars.  It 
depends only on the Court’s own conclusion that it did not matter whether the 
litigation was economically feasible without class arbitration because all you have 
is the right to pursue a claim, not to prove it.  The Court’s conclusion makes it 
okay to refuse to allow class arbitration, even if though that is effectively 
preclusive whenever expert fees exceed individual stakes at all.  That is so even on 
the charitable assumption that parties know that it is 100 percent likely that they 
are going to win, which is in fact implausible.  The notion that expert fees exceed 
individual stakes seems likely true in most mass-market cases, and certainly in 
Italian Colors, where the highest individual stake was $38,000.  If you can get an 
economics expert to give you a complex report for $38,000, I suspect you will get 
a quality as low as the fee that you are paying. 
Now, Michael argues that arbitrators could change the rules to lower the 
costs of proving a claim — for example, by lowering the standards for defining a 
market.  I actually doubt that they could do that.  I think an arbitrator who did so 
would be vulnerable to the finding that they have willfully disregarded the law if 
they found an illegal tie, for example, without reliable economic proof of tying 
market power.  But even if they could do so, do we really want arbitration 
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decisions based upon loosey-goosey assertions of market power and proof of 
effects?  I think that cure may actually be even worse than the disease. 
But let’s assume Michael is right about that.  The more important point to 
me is that Italian Colors holds that arbitration provisions do not have to make 
litigation economically feasible.  So why on Earth would they?  Corporations 
actually have every incentive to, instead, write their arbitration agreements to 
choose arbitration systems that do not try to lower costs, or that even specify that 
arbitrators cannot do so.  In short, given the logic of Italian Colors, there is nothing 
to stop businesses from immunizing themselves from private litigation, other than 
a failure of will or imagination.  
Now, Michael also notes that the Italian Colors Court’s opinion in footnote 
4 denied that the arbitration provision at issue there necessarily prohibited other 
forms of cost-sharing.  But the Court’s opinion also accepted in that same footnote 
the premise that those other forms of permissible cost-sharing, if they existed, were 
economically unfeasible, and said that that unfeasibility simply did not matter.  So 
the Court was not relying on the feasibility of some alternative method of cost-
sharing for his holding. The Court held it simply did not matter because the 
inability to prove a claim was not a problem.  So a corporation that chose an 
arbitration provision that provides no economically feasible alternative method of 
funding would face no difficulty in getting enforced under this opinion. 
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Michael also notes that on remand the Italian Colors plaintiffs argued that 
they could at least still pursue class action injunctive relief, an issue not really 
resolved since they settled.  But again, the trouble is that, under Italian Colors, 
future arbitration provisions could simply explicitly prohibit class injunctive relief, 
and that would be enforceable under the Court’s opinion.  So there is every reason 
to think that businesses would take advantage of that. 
Michael also suggests that an arbitration contract that denied effective 
antitrust enforcement would be unconscionable as a matter of contract law.  Putting 
on my contract law professor hat, I think not.  First, the reality is that this opinion 
allowed precisely that form of contract.  So, obviously, the Court did not think that 
it was unconscionable or unenforceable.  Second, under contract law, 
unconscionability requires both procedural unconscionability and substantive 
unconscionability.  Procedural unconscionability requires some unfair surprise, 
which will not be present as long as the arbitration provision is clear and salient.  
Substantive unconscionability requires an unequal bargain.  But there really isn’t 
one here, because the individual buyer’s right to pursue an antitrust claim against a 
market-wide harm really is not worth much on an individual basis.  So they are 
individually fairly compensated by a trivial discount in the contract.  The problem 
is that such agreements undermine the enforcement of rights to competition whose 
value is collective rather than individual.  
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Finally, Michael suggests that effective enforcement is not denied because 
private parties can — and the Italian Colors plaintiffs in fact did — also give their 
information to the government to pursue public claims.  But if that is really the 
only option we can count on in the future, to me that simply establishes my thesis, 
which is that this opinion threatens to change the U.S. regime into a one that relies 
only on public enforcement and largely abandons private enforcement. 
